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Experiencing Justice and Imagining
State: Engaging the Law to
Challenge the Rule of Exception in
Tunceli1
Marie Le Ray
1 During the 15-year war between the Turkish Army and the Kurdistan Workers Party,
Turkish military and civilian officials relied heavily on judicial institutions and the law
to control and sanction people living under emergency rule law in many parts of the
southeast. Although the lifting of emergency rule law in Tunceli and Hakkari in 2002
can be seen as marking an official end to the conflict, the inauguration of this ‘post-
emergency era’ did not signal a clear break with previous practices and power relations
on the ground.  In Tunceli/Dersim2, substantial legal restrictions on political activity
and  expression  continued,  as  did  extra-judicial  killings  and  state-sponsored  rights
abuses,  although  on  a  much  more  occasional  basis.  Courts,  moreover,  appeared
unwilling to sanction them, at least until the late 2000s. Nonetheless, inhabitants of
Tunceli have resorted to law to seek justice and redress, inviting the courts to make a
judgment on diverse issues.3
2 The fact that residents of Tunceli find law to be a useful if imperfect tool to combat
official abuses suggests that state-society relations can, as O’Brien and Li write (2005:
77), be fruitfully explored by examining the dynamics of legal struggle. It surely calls
for a more complicated picture of the state and its justice than a ‘them against us’
framing would  provide.  How  do  individuals  or  collective  actors  engage  law  in  an
environment in which possibilities of justice seem restricted? What resources do they
have, and what tactics do they develop to face obstacles and restrictions? What does
this tell us about state-society relations in this period of transition? 
3 In an effort to explore these questions, this paper examines the ways people seeking
redress actually experience and ‘learn’ justice. While paying further attention to the
conditions under which lawyers succeed (or not) in publicizing a case and in using
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cases for political causes, it also examines the role played by these ‘cause lawyers’4 –
 those who put political commitment into the center of their professional lives – in the
redefinition of the state-society relations.   
4 I demonstrate that even while such lawyers and their clients tend to imagine the state
as  a  coherent,  all-encompassing  and  often  hostile  entity,  they  also  develop  a
complicated knowledge of the inner working of the state that is sufficient to appeal to
diverse authorities and, in some cases, to play off one part of the state against another.
More,  I  argue that  the  diverse  resources  Tunceli  lawyers  draw from their  multiple
engagements  – i.e. social  and  political  networks  and  legal  skills –  enabled  them  to
consolidate an alternative language of justice and set of judicial practices. This meant
that even in a restrictive environment such as Tunceli, lawyers were able to create new
possibilities  for  justice  and to  offer  challenging  definitions  of  the  borders  between
legal/illegal,  legitimate/illegitimate and law/exception. Although favorable decisions
from domestic courts were unusual, at least through the late 2000s, what has happened
out of the court – in particular, the strategic interactions between judicial and non-
judicial actors – has been as important, if not more, than what happens in the court
itself. 
5 Beyond Tunceli, this case highlights the way transitions to new security and political
orders can indeed take very diverse forms, in contrast to the homogenous image of
‘political transition’ often promoted by international institutions. In fact, only rarely do
such transitions occur as steady evolutions towards peace and normalization. Rather,
they occur in a much more complicated and partial way characteristic of a ‘not war not
peace’ situation.5 I here consider transition as an intense period of struggle over the
socio-political  and  ideological  terms  of  the  national  project.  This  process  of
renegotiation  of  the  state’s  borders  and  of  the  ‘social  contract’  can  be  seen  more
precisely through the prism of law and uses of law. Indeed, as Rachel Sieder argues in
her study of postwar Guatemala, ‘one of the primary sites of engagement where such
different imaginaries and political projects are contested from the top-down and the
bottom-up is the law. This is because the law is central to claiming rights and enforcing
obligations’. In effect, she argues, the legal system is ‘converted into a contested site of
meaning’  over  state  accountability  and  citizens’  rights  (Sieder  2001:  204).  Law  is,
however, not considered here only as a discursive and technical resource in an abstract
debate over legitimate values. Law is also embodied and experienced according to one’s
actual position within a specific social and political configuration. Unpacking law thus
means unpacking political power.  
6 This study also contributes to recent literature on judicial struggles in authoritarian or
hybrid regimes. These studies generally concentrate on the ‘realist-strategic’ reasons
that bring authoritarian leaders to empower courts as  well  as  the strategies judges
develop to increase their autonomy and become (or not)  agents of  democratization
(Moustafa 2003; Pereira 2005;  Hilbink 2007).  Tamir Moustafa,  notably,  demonstrates
that courts  in  such  regimes  serve  as  ‘dual-use’  institutions:  they  consolidate  the
functions  of  the  authoritarian  states  but  also  open  new  avenues  for  activists  to
challenge regime policy (Moustafa 2003). Concerning the Turkish case, scholars have
similarly  tended  to  analyze  judicial  empowerment  in  the  light  of  ‘realist-strategic
theories’, either to highlight the selective nature of court activism (Belge 2006), its role
in  the  definition  of  the  legitimate  political  domain  (Koğacıoğlu  2004)  or  in  the
enforcement of the state ‘civilizing mission’ (Shambayati & Kirdiş 2009). 
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7 These studies all contribute in important ways to unveiling the way structures of power
are secured through alliances between the judiciary and the military. However, most of
them focus on higher courts. This paper, in contrast, draws our attention to the ‘other
end’ of the equation: to the politics of the judiciary as viewed through the activities of
lawyers, their clients, and lower courts, and, moreover, in one specific site.  My work
builds, then, on recent analyses such as that by Güneş Murat Tezcür, whose study on
the  critical  Şemdinli  case,  dealing  with  a  state’s  counterinsurgency  operation  in  a
remote southeastern town, offers a kind of critical breakthrough by conceptualizing
courts as interactive institutions seeking other political actors’ support and by focusing
on lower courts to question the conditions under which these courts can challenge
political  hegemony  (Tezcür  2009;  see  also  Aslan  in  this  issue).  Following  Tezcür,  I
acknowledge the idea that ‘lower courts play a crucial role in shaping citizens’ access to
substantive justice and perceptions of how the legal system functions’ (Tezcür 2009:
329) and I ‘localize’ my observation of the working of justice by concentrating on the
province  of  Tunceli.  Special  attention is  given as  well  to  the  alliances  and support
networks people are able to develop within this local configuration. 
8 This article relies on the press coverage of different trials from 2003 to 2009 in which
inhabitants of Tunceli sued the state or faced state accusations.6 Along with providing
some details of the legal proceedings involved, such coverage also demonstrates the
way  lawyers  ‘export’  their  cases  out  of  the  court  and  the  types  of  discourse  they
mobilize.  Secrecy and publicity  are  indeed at  the  core  of  the  legal  dynamics  I  will
explore7.  My  interest  here  lies  in  using  the  law  as  a  prism  to  highlight  the
transformation of state-society relations. The cases presented here are consequently
not  meant to  be  representative  but  illustrative  of  some  of  the  dynamics  of  this
transformation.  
9 The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss some of the ways the
state  comes  to  be  imagined  locally  by  observing  the  working  of  justice  and, more
specifically, the tactics developed to circumvent obstacles in this environment in which
national security is still given precedence over legal rationality. In the second section, I
turn to examining legal mobilization as a means of uncovering alternative norms that
challenge the conceptual borders of the state.
 
I. Imagining and experiencing the state through its
justice
Law and politics in Turkey: defining the legitimate political perimeter
10 Judges  and  prosecutors  in  Turkey  claim  authority  over  an  important  and  growing
number  of  social  and  political  issues  and  are  also  actively  involved  in  politics.
Beginning  with  the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  the  judiciary  has  contributed  in
important  ways  to  the  consolidation  of  the  Kemalist  system  and  to  securing  its
legitimacy.  In  their  contribution  to  the  national  project  of  ‘modernization’  and
‘westernization’,  judges,  prosecutors  and  bar  associations  have  adopted  a  rather
conservative  interpretation  of  Kemalism,  and  their  decisions  tend  to  support  state
positions as defined under the influence of the National Security Council.8 At the core
of these positions and principles is the exclusion of contentious political projects based
on ethnic or religious identity.  Elaborating on different courts’ decisions concerning
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the headscarf issue or political and human rights, Arslan concludes (2007: 223) that the
judiciary is in fact one of the most conservative institutions in the country.
11 The Constitutional Court has played a particularly important role in politics. Following
the 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution, the court came to constitute, in the words of
Shambayati  and  Kirdiş  (2009:  3),  ‘an  administrative  agent  assisting  the  military  in
simultaneously  regulating  the  political  society  and  transforming  the  nation’.  The
primary purpose of the courts is to enhance the powers of the state rather than to
protect citizens’ rights (Shambayati & Kirdiş 2009: 3). However, this conservative stand
should not be seen as the simple result of pressures exerted on the judiciary by the
military or other Kemalist forces, and, indeed, Dicle Koğacıoğlu and Ceren Belge offer
us a more complicated picture of this juridico-political sphere. Both focusing on the
case of the Constitutional Court, they observe that, while powerful and independent
enough to  frequently  rule  against  the government,  the  Court  has  been aligning on
entrenched statist nationalism and secularism in its decisions. Koğacıoğlu explains it as
a ‘shared discursive framework of secular statist nationalism with the National Security
Council’  but  immediately  warns  against  over-simplification:  ‘There  is  a  significant
range  of  variation  in  terms  of  the  ways  in  which  individual  members  articulate
elements of this framework with notions of democracy, international treaties, minority
rights, and so on. Thus, instead of seeing these cases as already-made decisions under
the  whispers  of  generals,  I  see  the  Court  engaging  with  a  medley  of  themes  and
tendencies that it tries to resolve case by case’ (Koğacıoğlu 2004: 441-442).  Here is thus
an invitation to disaggregate this encompassing statist framework to analyze how it is
concretely  activated  within  a  legal  system  conceived  as  plural  and  influenced  by
diverse  principles.  As  for  Belge, she  further  explains  this  alignment  on  Kemalist
secularism and nationalism by analyzing what she calls ‘the Republican alliance’, an
alliance empowered in 1960-1961 that included the military and civilian bureaucracy,
the Republican People’s Party, the intelligentsia (university and press) and university
students (Belge 2006). The Constitutional Court of Turkey was then one of several non-
majoritarian institutions established by Republican groups concerned with preserving
their  political  power,  whenever  necessary,  against  popular  majorities.  According to
Belge, the continued allegiance of the Court to these republican values in the last four
decades can be explained, at least until recently, by weak links with the international
human  rights  community  and  the  lack  of  direct  access  to  the  Court  for  the
nongovernmental organizations. Law schools largely remained institutions of Kemalist
socialization as well (Belge 2006: 658). Analyzing the rulings of the Court from 1962 to
1999, she demonstrates that the Court’s activism has not been inexistent but selective.
It has been highly active in defending the autonomy of the Republican alliance (judges,
prosecutors,  university  professors,  civil  servants)  from governments and even from
citizens, but it took a conservative stance on civil rights and liberties when mobilized
by  individuals  or  groups  challenging  the  hegemonic  status  of  Kemalism  (socialists,
communists and right-wing Democrat Party members in the 1960s and 1970s; Islamist
and Kurdish activists in the 1980s and 1990s). As she writes (2004: 671): ‘The concept of
the rule of law (…) was colored by a peculiarly Republican understanding of what was
arbitrary and what was lawful’. However, the author goes further by showing that this
Republican  alliance,  like  the  definition  of  Kemalism  as  an  ideology,  was  not  static
through the  decades.  When groups  disagreed within  the  alliance,  in  fact  when the
Republican’s People Party turned against the military during the 1970s (with a shift to
the left of the party) and in the early 1990s (with a brief alliance with Kurdish activist
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groups),  important gains for civil  rights were won through the Constitutional Court
(Belge 2004: 676). 
12 The  war  between  the  Army  and  the  Kurdistan  Workers  Party  (Partiya  Karkeren
Kurdistan, or PKK)9 and the consequent establishment of a long-lasting emergency rule
conferred a new dimension to this alliance between the judiciary and the military and
the  underlying  power  configurations  that  underlay  such relationships.10 During the
conflict,  the  Turkish  political  establishment  relied  heavily  on  law  to  control  and
sanction  people  challenging  their  political  project.  Officials  considered  any  public
expression  of  Kurdish  cultural  or  political identity  a  sign  of  support  for  the  PKK.
Moreover, the 1990s also saw a dramatic expansion in state-sponsored extra-judicial
killings and of forced evictions (Bruinessen 1996; Bozarslan 2001; Etten et al. 2008). The
state-supported units involved appeared to be acting with impunity, and law was not a
reliable  resource  for  people seeking  justice  and  redress  for  abuses  committed  by
security forces. In many ordinary people’s political imaginary, the state thus became
associated with the ‘deep state’, a network of agents operating illegally in the name of
national interest and under the protection of the consolidated alliance between the
Army, the National Security Council  and the Constitutional Court,  locally translated
into collusion between the diverse security forces and the courts. 
13 The  judiciary  in  Turkey  is  thus  at  the  core  of  an  intricate  and  dynamic  political
machinery. The ‘Republican alliance’, by its very composition, blurs the border between
what would be ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ elements. But it also appears to be very effective
in producing and preserving a hegemonic representation of what the state’s sphere of
action  and  the  ‘legitimate’  political  domain  should  be.  If  one  has  to  be  careful,  as
underlined, not to reify this alliance and disregard internal dynamics, the combination
of interests proved to be quite consistent in time. In fact,  Republicans rarely broke
their  ground with the military and,  more specifically,  from the 1990s onwards,  the
judiciary played its part in making national security and unity paramount by outlawing
the Kurdish and Islamist ‘enemies’.  The Constitutional Court actively contributed to
defining the boundaries of the political domain through, notably, its power to dissolve
political parties on constitutional grounds (Koğacıoğlu 2004). Most of these decisions
concerned Kurdish or religiously oriented parties. 
14 But how does the legal system operate at the local level? To what extent and around
which sets of practices do local prosecutors and lower courts define the boundaries of
the legitimate political  scene as well  as the borders of ‘the state’  and its legitimate
action? Looking at the case of Tunceli, the legal system appears very much involved in
regulating the local political scene and maintaining the boundary between friends and
enemies. Throughout the 1990s, public prosecutors in Tunceli brought multiple cases
against Kurdish activists or communist sympathizers. The lifting of emergency rule and
the replacement of the State Security Courts11 did not put an end to this form of judicial
activism. On the contrary, with the coming to power of a Kurdish DTP mayor in March
2004, public prosecutors appear even more prone to draw and monitor the demarcation
between legitimate and illegitimate political statements and behavior. In the first two
years of her tenure, Tunceli mayor Songül Erol Abdil, for instance, faced eight different
investigations. She ended her time in office in March 2009 with seven trials underway
against her.  The basis of these diverse legal proceedings included a group-authored
letter with other DTP mayors to the Danish prime minister that urged him not to close
the Denmark-based Kurdish station Roj  TV (2005),  Abdil’s  mention of  PKK guerrilla
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women on the occasion of the national day against violence on women (2007), and the
publication of a municipal catalogue entitled ‘Dersim municipality’  (referring to the
Kurdish name of  the  province)  and the  public  use  of  the  expression ‘geography of
Kurdistan’.  Her  case  is  far  from  unusual.  Just  to  name  another  example,  Abdullah
Demirbaş, the former DTP mayor of the Sur district in Diyarbakir, faced no fewer than
23 different legal actions between 2004 and 2009. The number of these proceedings
reveals  a  judiciary  actively  working  for  the  preservation  of  a  very  strict  public
grammar  by  quite  systematically  controlling  public  rituals  and  statements  that
prosecutors  and  judges  identify  as  challenging  statist  ideology.  Judges  and  public
prosecutors thus remain central figures in the ongoing conflict between ‘the state’ and
these political challengers, thus restricting challengers’ opportunities to redefine the
rules of the political game.
15 As  Nicole  Watts  has  demonstrated,  inclusion  in  formal  politics  ‘can  become  an
important ‘middle-ground’ activism for political and/or ethnic activists who straddle
the lines between formal/informal and legal/illegal resistance’ (Watts 2006: 126-127). It
indeed provides them with ‘an institutional basis for public collective gathering (…),
some  legal  protection  from  prosecution,  new  access  to  domestic  and  international
audiences, and new symbolic resources’ (Watts 2006: 126). But the legal harassment of
officeholders can also be relatively effective in regulating the public sphere by marking
a sharper line between legitimate and illegitimate – legal and illegal – statements and
behaviors.  In fact,  the Tunceli  mayor seemed quite affected by this harassment and
under pressure to censor herself: ‘This means we should not even talk. The moment we
open  our  mouth,  they  launch  investigations  and  trials  against  us!’  (Evrensel,
22/03/2009). She came to watch herself in everyday conversations or while talking on
the phone, concerned that any statement, even casual, would be used against her.12
16 Kurdish office-holders,  members of far-leftist  parties and associations,  and ordinary
citizens of Tunceli have experienced this political use of the law. Some of them came to
consider it useless, if not dangerous, to seek justice and redress in court, and consider
justice clearly one sided. In fact, the judicial system in Turkey is widely perceived as
deeply  politicized.  A  recent  study  conducted  by  the  Turkish  Economic  and  Social
Studies  Foundation,  for  instance,  shows  that  the  judiciary  is  largely  conceived  as
identical  with  the  state.  Interviewees  do  not  believe  in  the  independence  and
impartiality of the judicial system (Sancar & Aydın 2009).13 They see it as dominated by
an ‘etatist worldview’ and by favoritism and power relations.
 
Experienced justice, imagined state in Tunceli
17 In  Tunceli,  this  distrust  is  fed  by  different  practices  of  a  judicial  system  prone  to
harassing identified political ‘enemies’ and to offering protection for soldiers and other
state agents.  In this section of the paper I discuss the way practical encounters with
local officials – and the stories heard about a relative or a neighbor’s experience with
these officials – shape local perceptions. The cases I develop here are not meant to be
representative but rather illustrative of the obstacles that plaintiffs or the prosecuted
encounter in Tunceli. They shed light on the ways ‘justice’ and ‘the state’ come to exist
in these margins. 
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Obstacles to legal action: the prevalence of Turkish national interests
18 Lawyers and plaintiffs in Tunceli complain about a number of tactics and devices that
restrict and complicate the possibility of building a case and holding of a fair trial.
Getting a case accepted when the target is the local state is difficult. First, the local
governor has to give prior permission to open any investigation against representatives
of the state and may, quite arbitrarily, choose not to give this permission. For example,
when village heads of Hozat (a district of Tunceli province) came to complain about the
military’s burning of their forests in 2004, the local governor decided that there were
no  grounds  to  open an  investigation.  As  for  public  prosecutors,  when they  do  not
decide not to investigate for ‘security reasons,’ they can preempt or derail accusations
against state’s (security) agents in various ways. In September 1994, seven villagers of
Mirik disappeared in the middle of a military operation against the PKK. The village
was burnt afterwards. The case was then brought to the Tunceli Civil Court of First
Instance. Its final judgment was that ‘the concerned people have suddenly disappeared
in an area where physical security was not guaranteed owing to intense terror events
and the consequent military operations’  (Radikal,  12/05/2003).  Nine years  later,  the
relatives decided to sue again, accusing the military of being directly responsible for
the disappearances during this time. However, instead of investigating the case against
the military, the Tunceli chief prosecutor sent the file to the State Security Court of
Malatya. The justification given was that the bullets found on the crime scene came
from a Kalashnikov and not  from G3 weapons,  which,  according to the prosecutor,
directly pointed to the PKK and exonerated the army. This highly questionable practice
not  only  prolongs  the  procedure  – with  cases  possibly  getting  buried  in  transfers
between  courts  declaring  themselves  with  no  jurisdiction –  it  also  transforms  an
alleged crime committed by the Turkish army into a (PKK) crime against the Turkish
state. In a similar case concerning the disappearance of a 61-year-old villager who had
been detained by the military, the public prosecutor of Hozat declared the case beyond
his jurisdiction and transferred it to a military court (Radikal, 12/05/2003). The lawyer
in charge of the case was quite doubtful that the investigation and the suit would be
taken seriously in these conditions.
19 Other  mechanisms  constitute  serious  obstacles  to  attempts  to  sue  state  agents.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that plaintiffs can face judicial retaliation and be
turned from plaintiff into defendant. In Tunceli, the military is responsible for burning
extensive acreage of forests in its war against the PKK (Etten et al. 2008). When the Bar
Association in Tunceli applied to the court to request an investigation into the matter,
the public prosecutor decided to bring a case against the applicants on the ground that
such an allegation was an insult to the Turkish Army.14 Even when a prosecutor accepts
a case against state agents, it can decide to keep the results of this investigation secret
[gizlilik   kararı],  thus  preventing  the  lawyers  and  plaintiffs  from  having  access  to
documents and collected evidence.  The conditions under which evidence is collected
may also be questionable.  For instance,  in November 2007 in the district  of  Ovacık,
members of the gendarmerie allegedly fired at some villagers. They claimed that it had
happened in the middle of a skirmish, while villagers maintained that the gendarmerie
had fired several hours for no apparent reason. As an investigation was authorized, ‘the
public prosecutor chose to have the gendarme of the village in question carry out the
investigation, which involved gathering statements from the villagers at whom they
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had allegedly shot. Not surprisingly, the gendarmes did not find any evidence against
themselves.’15   
20 On the other hand, when political challengers are sued, prosecutions on the basis of
illegally  obtained  or  fabricated  evidence  seem  to  remain  common  practice.16
Prosecutors and courts may also choose to ignore possibly exonerating evidence. In
2005, the public prosecutor of Tunceli launched an investigation against Mayor Songül
Erol Abdil for allegedly celebrating the birthday of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the
local DTP office. The investigation was based on a news report found on the Internet.
Although the mayor demonstrated that she spent the entire day in a municipal council
meeting and the investigation concluded that there was no ground for prosecution, the
prosecutor nonetheless opened a trial against her.Abdil later declared: ‘I have always
cooperated  with  investigations  in  a  timely  manner  as  a  part  of  the  ordinary
competences  of  the justice.  But  this  investigation and the trial  indictment have an
extra-ordinary feature’. She considered addressing the Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors  on  that  matter  (Sabah,  27/04/2006).  In  another  case,  a  local  journalist,
working  for  the  Kurdish  agency  DIHA,  was  accused  of  having  provided  aid  and
assistance to members of an illegal organization on the basis of the confessions of a PKK
member.  The Heavy Penal  Court  of  Malatya  sentenced the defendant  to  6  years  of
prison, disregarding not only the fact that confession is not legally admissible evidence
in court but that an investigation had shown the defendant in another city on the date
he was alleged to have committed the crime (Evrensel, 03/07/2008).  
21 In these different cases, plaintiffs have experienced a justice that clearly sides with the
military and offers them impunity. Regardless of whether judges and prosecutors are
afraid to challenge the security regime or simply adhere to it, their behavior suggests
the  judicial  system  is  a  well-oiled  wheel  of  a  mechanism  with  a  single  chain  of
command.  One of  the  Tunceli  lawyers  put  it  this  way:  ‘In  Turkey,  the  influence of
specific institutions [the military command and governors] is very important. Judges
and prosecutors come to make decisions in accordance with what [these institutions]
say; their public statements (concerning a case) thus constitute a form of pressure on
judicial personnel’ (Evrensel, 08/05/2008). In the above-mentioned case, experiences of
justice thus feed a quite homogeneous picture of the state in which its different parts
apparently  act  in  a  concerted  way  (whether  voluntarily  or  due  to  pressure)  to
implement  a  hegemonic  doctrine  and  draw  a  clear-cut  line  between  friends  and
enemies.  This machinery appears sufficiently coordinated to make the line between
victim and perpetrator, and judicial and extra-judicial practices, less legible. However,
as the next section of the paper discusses, experiences of justice can also feed a more
complex, multi-layered, and fragmented picture of the state. 
 
Circumventing obstacles: practical learning of a multi-layered state
22 People gain a good sense of the fragmentation of the state when experiencing a justice
that works differently from one area to another. For example, in 1997, several soldiers
suffered minor injuries in a traffic accident between a civilian minibus and a vehicle of
the gendarmerie. The public prosecutor decided to open a lawsuit against the civilian
driver. The Tunceli Civil Court of First Instance found him not guilty, in accordance
with the police investigation report,  and exonerated him from responsibility in the
accident.  The  defendant  was  thus  quite  surprised  to  learn  that  he  was  found
responsible and sentenced to pay reparations for the same accident by the İskenderun
Experiencing Justice and Imagining State: Engaging the Law to Challenge the R...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
8
Civil Court of First Instance in a suit opened on the behalf of the public treasury. The
judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation and the case was finally brought to the
European Court of  Human Rights (ECHR).  In this  case,  two equivalent courts issued
different judgments while reviewing the same evidence. This discrepancy in judicial
decision-making casts  serious doubt  on the idea of  a  comprehensive justice  system
detached  from  political  influence,  maneuvers  and  local  configurations.  As  the
defendant’s lawyer put it: ‘the Court gave a decision in violation of basic rights and
justice; this decision strongly damages both the idea of justice and faith in it’ (Evrensel,
30/01/2007). 
23 However, inhabitants of Tunceli do not just passively observe this incoherence. Their
practical learning of the inner working of the state and its justice also appears in the
tactics they develop to circumvent obstacles. As many inhabitants and collective actors
in Tunceli understand how the legal system works, they often refuse to give up when a
court dismisses a case or when a verdict goes against them. They generally exhaust as
many legal remedies as possible, sometimes not so much because they believe in higher
courts to provide redress for grievances as to gain access to the European Court of
Human  Rights  (ECHR).  The  ECHR  has  indeed  often  constituted  the  sole  judicial
institution  people  trust  to  prosecute  acts  by  state  officials  and  administrations.
However, exhausting domestic remedies (as required by the ECHR) also increases the
plaintiff’s chances of finding a judge less anchored in the logics of the local political
game, less susceptible to certain kinds of political pressure, and more sensitive to other
arguments  and  considerations.  In  their  campaign  to  prevent  the  building  of  eight
different dams within the Munzur Valley, a national park since 1971, campaigners from
Tunceli have, for instance, played the game of administrative and legal litigation to its
fullest.  They first  supported the General  Directorate  of  National  Parks  and Wildlife
when it denied the General Directorate of State Water Works the authorization to drill
and conduct surveys within the valley. Since this did not work, they also called on the
Prime Ministry to cancel the Council of Ministers’ decision to award the construction
contract to an international consortium. This did not work either. However, in July
2005,  the 10th Chamber of  the Council  of  State,  the highest  administrative court  in
Turkey, accepted the plaintiffs’ claim and ordered the cancellation of the project. The
Council ruled that the project, falling inside the boundaries of a national park, lacked
legality  since  the  General  Directorate  of  State  Water  Works  had  not  produced  an
environmental impact report.17   But the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Murat Cano, also suggested
that the Council of State had validated the juridical links he had made between water,
climate, forms of life and (right to) life. And indeed, the Council of State had earlier
proven highly sensitive to environmental rights and the primacy of human life and
nature over economic gain (Arsel 2005: 269-70) and security considerations.18 However,
upon appeal of the government, the General Assembly of Administrative Chambers of
the Council of State reversed this ruling in May 2006. 
24 In seeking justice and redress, inhabitants of Tunceli may also look for backers among
authorities outside the judiciary. During the conflict, they often learned the hard way
that seeking a helping hand from higher authorities did not help them or could do
more  harm  than  good.19 Nonetheless,  especially  in  the  post-1999  period,  with  the
transformation of the emergency rule following the arrest of the leader of the PKK in
1999, and its official lifting in 2002, they have continued to try and address as many
centers of power as possible when faced with a judicial dead end. In 2008, for instance,
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87-year-old Yusuf Kaplan was arrested for allegedly providing food to the PKK. He was
jailed in  Elazığ,  a  neighboring province.  He was sentenced to  three years  and nine
months of jail in December 2005, and the Court of Cassation upheld the decision. After
three  months  in  jail,  his  daughter,  seriously  worried  about  his  health,  asked  for  a
reconsideration of his case based on health considerations. She applied to the Turkish
Presidency  for  amnesty,  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice, and  the  General  Directorate  of
Prisons,  asking that her father be transferred to prison in Tunceli.  In addition,  she
planned to have local  deputies bring the issue to the Parliament’s  attention (Aktüel
Bakış, 26/04/2008). 
25 The parliamentary deputy is a key figure. At the height of the conflict, and however
limited the latitude of maneuver at the time, the deputy – often called upon through
personal connections – could be the one to intervene (informally) to end a period of
detention or try and spare one’s son or daughter from torture. But the deputy is also a
key figure in helping a local trial become a nationally debated case by discussing it in
Parliament and, possibly, asking for parliament to send a delegation to investigate. In
September 2007, soldiers operating in the district of Hozat shot two villagers collecting
wood in the forest. One of them, Bülent Karataş, was killed. The other, Rıza Çiçek, was
heavily  wounded.  The  local  governor  and  the  General  Staff  declared  that  ‘two
terrorists’ had been ‘neutralized after having ignored soldiers’ warnings’. Hospitalized
in Elazığ,  Rıza Çiçek was directly transferred to prison on the request of the Elazığ
public  prosecutor,  to  be  later  charged  with  belonging  to  and  aiding  an  illegal
organization.  Meanwhile,  however,  many  residents  and  political  figures  in  Tunceli
mobilized  to  support  the  villagers.  A  delegation  of  deputies  from  the  opposition
Republican People’s Party (CHP) also chose to investigate. They notified the national
media, conveyed the results of their investigation to the CHP, and wrote a report for
the Parliament that directly challenged the military and local governor’s version of
events.  Their  findings  included,  among  other  discrepancies,  the  fact  that  the  two
villagers were unarmed and that Bülent Karataş had been shot on the front of his body
and  not  in  the  back,  as  a  narrative  of  non-compliance  to  the  order  to  halt  would
suggest. Their report concludes in favor of Rıza Çiçek, identified not as a terrorist but
as an ordinary villager, thus incriminating the soldiers. 
26 The fact  that  inhabitants  of  Tunceli  could mobilize this  kind of  political  support  is
crucial in any attempt to circumvent obstacles (such as secrecy deemed necessary for
security reasons) and challenge the state’s version of events. In this case, it offered an
alternative  version  of  events  audible  at  the  national  level,  shaking  the  mantle  of
security that affects the attribution of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ in Tunceli. This being
said, the power of even high-level officials should not be overestimated; in this case,
the intervention of the deputies did not prevent the Peace Court of Hozat from pressing
charges  and keeping Rıza  Çiçek  in  jail  for  eight  months  awaiting  trial.  In  the  end,
however, the Heavy Penal Court of Malatya released the defendant for lack of evidence
(Birgün, 22/04/2008).
27 Finally, inhabitants of Tunceli proved to be relatively effective in drawing attention to
their  problems with the justice  system through the media and collective  action,  in
order to gain a national audience. Dense transnational networks of migrants are also a
key  resource  in  reaching  an  international  public  and  gaining  support  from
organizations  such  as  Amnesty  International  and  from  the  European  Union,  for
example. In the case of the campaign against the dams, collective action preceded and
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followed every step of the judicial struggle. Campaigners expanded their network, their
visibility, and their expertise by linking with other collective environmental actions at
the  national  and,  to  some extent,  the  international  level.  In  this  way,  the  Munzur
campaigners  participated  in  March  of  2009  in  a  ‘Water  Court’  held  during  the
Alternative  Water  Forum  of  Istanbul.  The  court  was  an  initiative  conceived  as  a
response to the 5th World Water Forum that aimed to rethink the management of world
water  resources.  The  trial  reenacted  ‘what  should  have  been,’  according  to  the
organizers, a court decision that takes into consideration the different national and
international  agreements Turkey is  signatory to.20 It  is  difficult  to evaluate to what
degree such actions affect the judicial struggle, but, at least in the case of the Munzur
dams, they provided resources campaigners could use to re-frame their struggle. The
past legal experiences of the peasants of Bergama for example, who fought the use of
cyanide  in  the  extraction of  gold  in  a  newly  opened mine,  brought  together  these
activists  and certainly  shaped activists’  legal  approach and framing in  the  Munzur
campaign (Le Ray 2005). 
28 The different cases and tactics  presented here provide interesting insights  into the
ways people experience the judiciary and in turn, develop their own sets of practices on
the margins. On the one hand, many people came to consider the judicial system as an
instrument  of  domination  and  regulation  controlled  by  the  military  and  other
dominant political forces. It is then part of a view of the state-society relationship seen
as a ‘them versus us’ relationship. The tendency to seek justice through the courts and
through  other  institutions  or  forms  of  organization  (international  organizations,
higher authorities,  collective action)  can be understood as  a  sign of  distrust  of  the
judicial system.
29 On the other hand, the way people are using the courts and mobilizing around them
also demonstrates that they have developed a fairly complex picture of the legal system
and, beyond that, of the state. I  would argue that the tendency to address multiple
levels of authority within and outside the judicial system reveals an understanding of
the judiciary as anchored in both a local and a broad political context and as a many-
layered institution with diverse, possibly conflicting agendas. In this understanding,
the political resources that people are able to mobilize by using the fragmentation of
the state is as important as the content of the legal procedures. The fact that people of
Tunceli  sometimes  succeed  in  finding  support  among authorities  (e.g. deputies  and
political parties) and in having, at a given moment, some parts of the state (in the cases
discussed above, the Malatya Heavy Penal Court, the Directorate of National Parks and
the Council of State) challenge others, definitely blurs the boundaries between state
and society and calls for a less dichotomous perspective. 
30 Citizens’ ability to mobilize support, to use the fragmentation and incoherence of the
state  against  itself,  creates  opportunities  for  justice  by  providing  specific  political
resources  and  multiplying  the  arenas  in  which  contentious  issues  are  debated.
 Nonetheless, the existence of such opportunities by no means guarantees success for
plaintiffs.  The  steps  that  inhabitants  of  Tunceli  took  to  sue  the  state  or  to  defend
themselves  against  state  charges  often  proved  unsuccessful.  Moreover,  these  legal
procedures could last for months, cost a considerable amount, sometimes require the
plaintiffs or defendants and their lawyers to drive hundreds of kilometers to testify,
and might entail threats and coercion. Even after the official lifting of emergency rule,
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law thus remained an unreliable resource for people willing to challenge a state they
viewed as unjust.
31 Nonetheless,  Tunceli  has  become  the  site  of  active  legal  mobilization.  Politically
disadvantaged people resort to legal measures to promote a wide range of rights and
interests: not only to seek redress for offenses perpetrated by state security forces but
also concerning the right to return to villages, the security management of the region,
the  building  of  dams  within  the  Munzur  Valley,  and  the  preservation  of  Tunceli
cultural patrimony as defined by local collective actors. This growing legal mobilization
does not owe so much to the new opportunities of a ‘post-conflict’ legal system as to
the background characteristics and networks of the legal entrepreneurs involved and
the status of  local  power relationships.  Legal  mobilization in Tunceli  thus does not
result from a ‘normalization’ of the legal and political system; it constitutes a form of
political participation through which the very border between normality and exception
and the boundaries of the legitimate political domain are actively renegotiated. As we
shall see, inhabitants and collective actors of Tunceli resort to legal mobilization to
challenge the conceptual boundaries of the state.
 
II. Engaging the law
Justice as a site of contention? Marking the borders of exception
through legal struggle
32  Following the lifting of the state of emergency in 2002, the government passed a series
of reforms that offered more protection for individual rights and, at least in theory,
made it easier for ordinary people to use the legal system to seek justice. Provisions
restricting pre-trial detention rights were amended. In May 2004, the State Security
Courts were abolished. A ‘Law on the compensation of damages that occurred due to
terror and the fight against terrorism’ was also approved. In June 2005, a new penal
code entered into force, including provisions concerning torture and ill-treatment. The
Turkish criminal code and the criminal procedure code were amended in December
2006. In Tunceli  itself,  jurisdictional assistance became available to people with low
financial  resources from December 2002 on,  with first  applicants  in 2004.  A human
rights board and a mailbox for anonymous complaints for abuses were installed within
the governorship. Local authorities also entered in (a limited) dialogue on the question
of  internally  displaced  people  with  one  of  the  non-governmental  organizations
operating  in  Tunceli.  According  to  the  governor,  about  500  houses  were  rebuilt  in
villages  between  2000  and  2008,  and  nearly  4,000  people  received  financial
compensation in the same period(Yeni Şafak, 14/11/2008).
33  All these devices were meant to represent guarantees offered by a state in transition.
However, the transition to a ‘postwar state’ did not correspond to a clear-cut rupture or
constitute a continuous and irreversible process. In Turkey, the unilateral cease-fire of
the PKK in 1999 and the official  lifting of  the emergency rule  in July 2002 did not
suddenly turn war into peace and a state of emergency rule into a binding rule of law
on the whole national territory. Inhabitants of Tunceli certainly saw improvements in
their political  and everyday lives as soon as 1999.  But these improvements and the
practical implementation of legal reforms have been very dependent on the subsequent
national and local security agenda. The PKK’s end to its unilateral cease-fire in June
Experiencing Justice and Imagining State: Engaging the Law to Challenge the R...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
12
2004, in particular, ended a relatively violence-free period, and after this time the legal
and security situation in Tunceli deteriorated. The AKP, first inclined to establish an
EU-oriented  reformist  dynamic,  chose  to  keep  a  low  profile  when  faced  with  ‘the
interplay  of  rising  Turkish  nationalism,  mounting  inter-ethnic  violence  and  a
comeback of the armed forces to the sphere of politics’ (Öktem 2006). In this context,
the implementation of the different reforms was mitigated. Some of the amendments
seemed  quite  cosmetic,  and  some  new  legislation  even  reintroduced  former
restrictions. Setbacks were particularly obvious regarding the criminal courts, police
laws and anti-terror laws. Anti-terror legislation was amended in June 2006 in response
to  ‘an  escalation  of  terrorism.’  In  June  2007,  three  Kurdish  provinces  on  the  Iraqi
border  were  declared  ‘high  security  zones,’  which  led  to  the  implementation  of
extraordinary security measures, fueling worries about a practical return to the state of
emergency.  Transition  thus  constitutes  a  highly  dynamic  and  contested  political
process. Indeed, post-conflict transition can be seen as a period during which a range of
political actors compete to impose their definition of state and citizenship. 
34 In  Tunceli,  legal  mobilization  did  offer  some  tools  and  spaces  to  renegotiate  the
conceptual borders of the state. First, it enabled individuals and collective actors to ask
for  the  redefinition  of  the  state  and  its  justice  through  the  renegotiation  of  the
separation  between  rule  of  law  and  rule  of  exception.  Exception,  again,  cannot  be
considered a form of governance that simply appears when the emergency rule ends.
The approach Veena Das and Deborah Poole develop in their study of the margins of
the state (Das & Poole 2004) is useful here in helping us further explore the relationship
between law, margins and exception. When the authors elaborate on the characteristics
of the margins, they indeed resort to the idea of ‘exception’ but rule out its conception
as ‘an event that can be confined to particular kinds of spaces or periods in time, or a
condition that stands opposed, somehow, to ‘normal’ forms of state power’ (Das & Poole
2004: 11). Drawing on Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, they rely on
the latter’s notion of ‘bare life’, a life that can be taken without the mediation of law
and without incurring the guilt of homicide, and the form of sovereignty it reveals, to
look for its embodiments in the everyday life. As Das and Poole write (2004: 13-14), the
focus is consequently on: 
Those practices that seem to be about the continual  refounding of  law through
forms of violence and authority that can be construed as both extrajudicial and
outside,  or  prior  to,  the  state.  This  refounding  happens  both  through  the
production of  killable  bodies,  as  posited by  Agamben,  and through the  sorts  of
power embodied by figures such as the policeman or local ‘boss’ (…) It is precisely
because they also act as representatives of the state that (these figures) are able to
move across – and thus muddy – the seemingly clear divide separating legal and
extralegal forms of punishment and enforcement’. 
35 Such  figures  in  Turkey  would  include  policemen,  members  of  the  Gendarmerie
Intelligence and Counterterrorism Center [Jandarma   İstihbarat  ve  Terörle  Mücadele,  or
JİTEM], and village guards (villagers armed by the Turkish authorities in their fight
against the PKK). The village guard system was put into place in 1985 by law. Such
militias were under the control of the Interior Ministry but, locally, came under the
direct authority of the gendarmerie for situations concerning security and information.
They actually work in close collaboration with special  forces like JİTEM and can be
linked to diverse banditry activities and the criminal economy (Balta 2004; Dorronsoro
2006). The inclusion of these village guards as official operatives in the enforcement of
national security interests did redefine the borders of ‘the state’ by transforming the
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way  it  was  embodied  and  practically  experienced  at  the  local  level.  It  in  fact
contributed  to  rendering  the  state  less  legible  because  these  village  guards  have
crossed the divide between legal and extralegal forms of enforcement and have used
their acquired right to violence to settle local and community conflicts. As for  JİTEM, it
continued to operate illegally even after the lifting of the emergency rule, although
commanders of gendarmerie and some officials have denied its existence. Believed to
be involved in numbers of crimes including kidnapping, torture, extrajudicial killing,
and  bombing,  its  members  have  remained  largely  unaccountable  (Ağaşe  2006).  In
Tunceli itself, these hybrid figures may be involved in the disappearance and murder of
the seven Mirik villagers in 1994, as well as in the assassination of Imam Boztaş  in
March 2004 and Hasan Şahin in August 2005.21Again, the impunity the JİTEM members
enjoyed let them appear an embodiment of the state’s justice and violence and made
clear that ‘the frontier between the legal and extralegal runs right within the offices
and institutions that embody the state’ (Das & Poole 2004: 14).         
36 In this conception, it is hard to find a clear division between forms of violence that are
in and out of law as this frontier evolves in parallel with the constant re-founding of
the state. Exception itself and ‘killable bodies’ can be produced through a complex legal
process or thanks to the quiet acquiescence of the judiciary. But,  at the same time,
when parts of the state are willing to change the way the state and justice are imagined,
law can become a discursive resource, a ‘language of justice’ in the hands of activists
opposed to embodied practices of law. In Tunceli, applicants this way both demanded
state accountability and tried to outlaw forms of governance by exception. They tried,
in short, to push back the boundaries of exception.  
 
Looking for accountability
37 Beginning in 2008, at the national level, the Ergenekon case led to the investigation of
an alleged clandestine neo-nationalist network involving military and police officers,
politicians, prominent media members and businessmen. They were accused of trying
to topple the elected government through a military coup. Many observers saw this
case as indicating a possible end of impunity for the agents embodying the state of
exception.22 In Tunceli, the Ergenekon case created hopes, or at least opportunities, to
ask for investigations concerning unsolved political murders in the province (Bianet,
13/01/2009) and the Kurdish region more generally. However, even before Ergenekon,
in the mid-1990s, inhabitants and lawyers in Tunceli began applying to the judiciary to
investigate the disappearance or death of their relatives. In October 1994 for example,
Kasım Aydın, an inhabitant of Hozat,  asked the public prosecutor to investigate his
father’s  disappearance  and  the  destruction  of  his  house.  Sixteen  people  either
disappeared or were found dead in the area at that time. In 1998, the prosecutor of the
Malatya State Security Court opened an investigation after the Hozat prosecutor, the
District  administrative  council  and  the  prosecutor  of  the  Gendarmerie  General
Command had successively declared that they had no jurisdiction. This investigation
continued for years, with the plaintiffs eventually applying to the ECHR. In April 2001,
the Turkish government finally offered compensation to the applicants for a friendly
settlement.23 Many other victims, though, found themselves trapped in judicial dead
ends or did not dare file a lawsuit. This was the situation, for instance, in the case of
Nazım Gülmez, a 61-year-old villager seized by a commando team in 1994 and never
returned.  When  his  relatives  visited  lawyer  Hüseyin  Aygün  to  talk  to  him  about
Experiencing Justice and Imagining State: Engaging the Law to Challenge the R...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
14
opening a case nine years later, after the events, they explained that they had been too
afraid of possible retaliation to do so before (Radikal, 12/05/2003). Only following the
official lifting of the emergency rule and the experience of several years of relative
calm  did  such  people  begin  to  look  for  their  missing  relatives  and  ask  for
accountability. 
38 Until  the  late  2000s,  these  trials  did  not  prove  very  effective  in  pushing  justice  to
seriously  investigate  disappearances  and  killings,  and  even  less  in  sanctioning  the
perpetrators of these crimes.24 In the case of the disappeared villagers of Mirik, years of
procedure and  introduction  of  new  evidence  resulted  only  in  the  payment  of  a
‘symbolic compensation’ to the family for what was still characterized, 15 years after,
as an ‘attack by unknown assailants’  (Bianet,  13/01/2009).  But the strength of these
trials  may be elsewhere,  more specifically,  outside the court,  as the lawyers’  public
declarations and their media coverage25 force the sensitive issue of state accountability
to the agenda and contribute to activating a public debate on the redefinition of the
state’s borders. 
39  In their public statements concerning these trials, lawyers skillfully combine elements
of law and more general political  rhetoric.  Their language of justice often refers to
fundamental rights and higher law including the Turkish Constitution and different
international conventions Turkey is signatory to, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right to life is, quite
logically, at the core of this struggle against practices and ‘figures of exception,’ against
the production of  ‘bare  life’.  In  August  2008,  in  the  case  involving villagers  Bülent
Karataş and Rıza Çiçek, lawyer Hüseyin Aygün invoked the Turkish Constitution and
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  concerning  the  right to  life  and  the
abolition of death penalty. He declared: ‘It is not enough that governments suspended
the death penalty. If members of the police and gendarmerie deliberately kill people, if
they make a practice of killing people, if these murders remain unpunished by decision
of courts and judges and, finally, if the perpetrators of these crimes can benefit from
legal devices such as prescription, then the abolition of death penalty in this country is
pointless’ (Ajansdoğu,  25/08/2008). In a somewhat different vein, when, in May 2009,
lawyer Barış  Yıldırım tried to challenge the creation of temporary security areas in
Tunceli, he referred again, following a technical legal argument, to fundamental rights
and liberties. In a statement made in cooperation with different political parties and
labor unions, he indeed questioned the legality of such security zones, arguing that
their creation would require the Parliament’s intervention. He further asserted that the
creation of  these temporary zones of  security would prevent access  to villages and
pastures, in contradiction to the fundamental principles of liberty of circulation and
property rights. He then addressed the government and military general staff in these
terms: ‘In this province in which you never invested, that never received its share of
the budget, do you think about how thousands of animal keepers and villagers will find
enough to eat and drink?’  (Cihan,  16/05/2009).  In these public declarations,  lawyers
attempt to confront the state and justice with discrepancies between written law and
practice.  Their  technical  knowledge  of  both  national  and  international  legal  texts
enable them to try and ‘make the system live up to what it’s supposed to be’ (Diamant
2005: 11). The ‘majestic’ vision of law they promote then supports calls for a single legal
order applicable throughout the country. But these lawyers also work at exacerbating
inhabitants’ sense of injustice while pointing at and building connections with larger
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social  or  political  grievances  or  unveiling  the  functioning  of  a  double-standard  of
justice. Today, this language of justice, articulated around fundamental human rights
against the prevalence of the language of security, significantly shapes the local public
sphere.  It  offers  a  challenging  version  of  where  the  division  between  legal  and
extralegal practices should stand, and of what the borders of legitimate state action
should be. 
40 How did this language become audible and to what extent does it resonate within the
judiciary  itself?  If  so,  what  does  it  tell  us  about  the  state-society  relations  and  its
possible transformation? The next section of my paper discusses these questions.
 
An emerging normative community? Cause lawyers and the
discourse of human rights
41 Lawyers  in  Tunceli  have  played  a  central  role  in  the  emergence  of  an  alternative
language of justice, notably based on an innovative legal argumentation and able to
challenge parts of the statist ideology. They are the main figures through which the
norms of justice were brought out of the courtroom and into public debate. Some of
these lawyers indeed expanded public interpellations as well as interviews and articles
within diverse media to inform the public, to question existing norms and practices of
justice, and to propose alternative uses of law. They framed their declarations so as to
turn ‘private’ legal disputes into calls for political change. They did so using diverse
sensitive  issues  that  had  to  be  negotiated  in  this  period  of  transition:  forced
disappearances  and  extra-legal  killings,  return  to  villages,  state  compensation,  and
conditions for public gathering and public speech. They also took part in and offered
legal support for pre-existing or emerging local causes, such as the Munzur campaign
against  the  dams,  and  diverse  national  causes  such  as  a  symbolic  hunger  strike
organized in November 2006 to denounce conditions in Turkish prisons. A call to ‘speak
the  language  of  peace  and  not  the  language  of  violence’  was  issued  in  a  common
statement with other bar associations in December 2006. And in February 2008, the
Tunceli Bar Association, with other bar associations of the southeast, organized a press
conference to question and condemn Turkish military operations in North Iraq.26
42 Moreover, these lawyers felt entitled to educate people about their rights and to warn
them about possible abuses. After the official lifting of emergency rule, they organized
seminars  and  distributed  leaflets  to  inform  people  about  the  new  legal  provisions
concerning security devices and practices, such as identity controls, custody, and, more
recently, uses of surveillance cameras (Evrensel, 25/12/2007). Independent of the cases
they could advocate, these lawyers thus continuously struggled to expand the domain
of rights against exception and reframe – through the diffusion of legal knowledge and
frequent public statements – inhabitants’ sense of justice. 
43 Lawyers in Tunceli became extensively involved in the local public sphere from the
beginning of  the first  decade of  the 21st century.  They grew increasingly organized
through the creation of the Tunceli Bar in 2001 (by 2010 involving 30 lawyers) and the
subsequent  establishment  of  specific  commissions  (on  women  and  children,  the
environment, and human rights) in late 2004. This public engagement owes much to
these lawyers’ biographical trajectories and to the networks they were able to build. 
44 Hüseyin Aygün and Özgür Ulaş Kaplan are two of these publicly engaged lawyers. Born
in the early 1970s, they both studied in Tunceli before entering, respectively, Ankara
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and  Istanbul  law  schools.  They  were  both  politically  active  students.  For  political
reasons, Aygün had to interrupt his activities and finally graduated in 1995. He chose
not  to  pursue  an  academic  career  – his  initial  desire –  believing  he  would  be
discriminated  against  because  of  being  a  Tunceli-born,  leftist  Alevi  Kurd  (Radikal,
21/02/2005).  In  1998,  Aygün  and  Kaplan  both  returned  to  Tunceli  as  lawyers  and
opened an office together. At their instigation, the Tunceli Bar Association was created
in February 2001, and Aygün became its first president. In the same period, Kaplan took
leadership of the newly created Association for the Protection of Wildlife in the Munzur
Valley, an environmentalist association mainly devoted to preventing the building of
the dams within the valley. In 2006, he became president of the bar association. Aygün,
meanwhile, became involved in the production of a local newspaper that focused on the
revival of the Zaza language. In May 2009, he published a book on the forced exile of
Tunceli inhabitants following the large military operations and massacres in the region
in 1937-1938. In the municipal elections of March 2009, he also actively supported an
independent, far left candidate. 
45 These lawyers appear to be multi-positioned in-between the judicial, the political, and
the activist  spheres.27 Their ability to enter public space is  to be understood in the
learning  experiences  and the  successful  mobilization  and combination  of  resources
coming from both their professional and activist spheres.28 Arguably, again, the lifting
of emergency rule offered a somewhat more conducive legal and political environment
for these cause lawyers. But, while learning about this changing environment by trial
and error, the lawyers contributed to the expansion of what constituted ‘legitimate’
boundaries on discourse and practice. These lawyers’ public engagement, well beyond
the borders of the courts, is indeed quite risky. When asked about the difficulties he
encountered opening an office in a zone of (post)conflict, Özgür Ulaş Kaplan stated that
he ‘only’ had to suffer slight intimidation that was ‘nothing comparable’ to what Ali
Demir, the only lawyer in Tunceli prior to 1998, had experienced. Demir had been taken
into custody and heavily beaten.29 But these politically-motivated lawyers also had to
face practices of exception. On February 13, 2005, Aygün organized a press conference
to announce that gendarmerie regiment commander had threatened his life. According
to Aygün’s report, the commander told his relatives that Aygün was a ‘traitor to the
nation’,  an ‘enemy of  the state’,  and that he was tired of  ‘finding him under every
stone’. He told Aygün personally that he was not well thought of by the gendarmerie
and  suggested  he  stop  his  activities  (Bianet,  15/02/2005).  Following  the  press
conference, Aygün was put on trial for slandering the gendarmerie commander.30 In
April 2005, the Tunceli public prosecutor asked for an investigation into Aygün and
Kaplan: their names, this time, had allegedly been found in a notebook belonging to an
armed  militant  killed  in  a  military  operation.  They  were  therefore  suspected  of
belonging  to  this  Turkish  leftist  armed  movement  (Bianet,  12/12/2005).  Forensic
analyses later revealed that their names had been added to the document after it was
originally drafted (KHRP 2008: 41). In 2006, the commander of the gendarmerie again
asked the prosecutor to launch legal proceedings against the bar association on the
ground that it ‘coerces individuals into making applications to the ECHR’ (KHRP 2008:
41). 
46 In such an environment, in which security forces tend to conceive lawyers as a threat
to the integrity of the state, local and international networks of support have played a
critical role in protecting them. When he was threatened by the commander of the
gendarmerie,  Aygün decided  to  go  public.  Being  a  local  public  figure  embedded in
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important social and political networks, he could count on the support of elected local
representatives and deputies, of local political parties and trade unions, and of diverse
associations such as the Human Rights Association (İHD). A campaign to support a man
recognized as a human rights lawyer who had brought hundreds of cases to the ECHR
was  also  organized  abroad  by  organizations  such  as  Amnesty  International,  at  the
instigation of the Tunceli migrant networks. The globalized discourse of human rights
thus not only structures a challenging language of justice to oppose the hegemony of
security forces, it also provides Tunceli lawyers with possibility that their activities and
words will resonate and be recognized in multiple spaces. This ability to appeal to an
international community highlights the strength the Tunceli lawyers can wield. As Lisa
Hajjar reminds us,  the human rights business requires cultural  capital  (Hajjar 1997:
497). Cause lawyers, indeed, need to activate specific political and intellectual resources
to connect with media and other human rights organizations at the local level but also,
possibly, at the international level. It then enables these lawyers to project counter-
hegemonic  views  by  relying  on  the  ‘inherent  contradiction  between  supranational
human rights ideals and the local politics of hegemony’ (Hajjar 1997: 497).  
 
Human rights and rule of law in the state’s self-performance            
47 In this period of transition, the Tunceli lawyers have not been the only ones mobilizing
the discourse of  human rights and rule of  law in an effort  to (re)define the state’s
boundaries. State officials have also used human rights frames.31 For instance, Tunceli
Chief  of  Police  Osman  Öztürk,  who  served  from  September  2004  and  August  2008,
declared he wanted to transform the image of the police and its  relations with the
population of Tunceli, and initiated a program called ‘To lend a friendly hand.’ In this
program, the police are not only responsible for security but also actively involved in
securing  the  social  welfare  of  inhabitants.32 In  this  way,  policemen  and  women  in
Tunceli sponsored orphan children, distributed clothes during cold winters, proposed
basic  health care  for  the poor and regularly  volunteered in  schools  to  build  closer
relations with children, in a project entitled ‘Uncle police, Aunt police’ (Bizim Anadolu,
15/07/2005). Further indicating his desire to ‘bring the population together’ and gain
its trust, Öztürk said: 
Tunceli  is  a  province  that  experienced  severe  terrorism,  a  place  in  which
inhabitants have sometimes suffered from terrorists’ psychological pressure. It is a
province that has experienced many terrible events. It is like this if we look at the
historical past as well... So, through our achievements, we have demonstrated to
our citizens that we do not consider them inherently guilty or potentially culpable.
But  although our  inhabitants  here  are  people  worthy of  this  country's  greatest
respect, there are also those among them who commit crimes. These people will be
brought to justice,  in accordance with the law and with consideration for what
happened during these terrible years. In so doing, we will respect and comply with
human rights, fundamental rights and liberties as defined in the Constitution and
laws, proving that we are doing our job well aware that our country is a state of law
(Bizim Anadolu, 15/07/2005). 
48 This chief of police had undoubtedly mastered the language of human rights and rule of
law. He seemed to perfectly incarnate this ‘new bureaucratic generation’ called on to
develop ‘an intrinsic respect for human rights’ (KHRP 2008: 58). A highly experienced
officer, he has a training that includes participation in diverse professional seminars in
the United States as well as in Europe. If Öztürk speaks the language of law and human
rights, it is thus to redefine the role of the police within these ‘globalized’ norms, in an
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effort to promote a renewed image of the police, far from the practices of exception
that  used  to  blur,  in  an  encompassing  perception  of  the  Tunceli  inhabitants  as
‘presumed guilty’, the distinction between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. 
49 The  opening  ceremony  of  the  judicial  year  in  September  2008  also  constituted  an
interesting moment of this public self-performance of a transforming state. Present at
the ceremony were the governor of Tunceli, the vice-mayor of the city, heads of the
gendarmerie and the chief of police. The public prosecutor elaborated then on a quite
majestic conception of justice – as ‘a sacred value that does not tolerate the slightest
stain’ – to remind listeners of the need for an independent and impartial justice, this
time for the sake of the state: 
In societies where peace and tranquility have collapsed, in countries where trust in
the power of Justice is not acquired, it is very difficult to secure the continuity of
the state (…) Members of the judiciary must operate without taking a stand, they
should  make  their  decision  without  regard  for  someone’s  position  within  the
society,  his  or  her  financial  situation,  skin  color,  philosophical  beliefs,  political
conviction, religion or nationality, but, rather, in accordance with what law and
conscience dictate (Cihan, 08/09/2008).
50 Does this indicate that a common language of law and justice has been emerging in
Tunceli,  a  language  that  cause-lawyers,  public  prosecutors  and  police  officers  are
coming  to  share?  Patricia  Woods,  looking  at  the  case  of  Israel,  argues  that  cause
lawyers there played an important role in redefining the content and norms of the
‘judicial community,’ bringing about meaningful political change. She sheds light on
the ‘diffuse, informal and formal legal interaction, debate and conflict’ that animate the
judiciary socio-professional community and argues that these interactions contributed
to the development of new legal norms, thus enabling the Israel High Court of Justice to
challenge the autonomy of religious institutions in the late 1980s (Woods 2003). 
51 In the case of  Tunceli,  interactions seem to remain still  limited and purely formal.
When the bar association approached the newly appointed chief of police to propose a
series  of  joint  seminars  on human rights issues  for  example,  the  police  apparently
chose not to participate (KHRP 2005: 55). In October 2007, on the other hand, the chief
of police did visit lawyer Barış Yıldırım, the local representative of the Human Rights
Association  (İHD),  to  reassert  ‘the  deep  commitment  of  the  police  organization  to
human rights and freedoms within the democratic, laic and social state that Turkey is’
(Zaman, 28/10/2007). This public discourse of a shared commitment to human rights
does not seem, however, to be translated into a shared way of making use of the law
and embodying it. Less than one month before the chief of police visited Yıldırım, for
instance, the police headquarters filed a complaint against him for a public statement
he made condemning what he referred to as the military forces’ repeated violations of
rights and abuses against civilians. Even if all parties are familiar with the conceptual
framework of human rights, then, it can be used to serve different political projects.
Nonetheless,  some recent court decisions may indicate some changes in these same
alliances and invite us to pay more attention, beyond the given signal of conflict, to the
transformations affecting political configurations.
 
Legal breakthrough: changing alliances? 
52 The following cases illustrate several issues in which local courts in Tunceli produced
decisions  that  challenged  the political  status  quo.  These  adjudications  not  only
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challenged the definition of the political and public domains promoted by the security
forces, they also undermined the terms of the dominant ideology, opening new avenues
for the redefinition of the ‘social contract’.
53 On 12 February 2008, the Tunceli Civil Court of First Instance dismissed a case opened
against two members of a Turkish leftist party for having distributed leaflets in 2007
inviting people to the Kurdish spring celebration of ‘Newroz’ (the Turkish authorities
have reactivated this celebration as well, but under the name ‘Nevruz’, banning and
harshly repressing for long the ‘Newroz’ celebration)33.  Their lawyer, Barış  Yıldırım,
successfully argued that ‘Newroz’ was a proper name, and therefore did not violate the
law on political parties’ stating that no other language than Turkish should be used
during  party  events  and  for  their  placards.  According  to  Yıldırım,  this  decision
constituted a landmark decision (Zaman, 19/05/2008).  
54 On 14 February 2008, the Tunceli Chief Public Prosecutor decided to drop proceedings
against Yıldırım for his September 2007 statement criticizing the military. He based his
decision on paragraph four of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which states that
criticism made to express one’s opinion cannot constitute a crime. This constituted a
groundbreaking  decision.  As  one  Bianet  headline  claimed:  ‘If  only  everybody  was
interpreting 301 like the Tunceli prosecutor!’ (Bianet, 14/02/2008). Five days later, the
Tunceli Peace Court dismissed a case against Hanefi Bekmezci, a trade-union member
also sued under Article 301 for a public statement made in September of 2005. The
court  first  sentenced  him  to  five  months  in  prison,  later  converted  to  a  fine.  But
Yıldırım,  serving  as  his  laywer,  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeals,  citing
decisions by the ECHR. On November 2007, this court overruled the sentence, ‘arguing
that the statement he had read was ‘intended as heavy criticism’ and did not represent
a  crime’  (Bia  news   center,  20/02/2008).  The  Tunceli  Peace  Court  submitted  to  this
decision and acquitted Bekmezci. Bianet interpreted this as an important precedent for
cases prosecuted under Article 301 (see e.g.Bianet, 19/02/2008).34
55 In March 2008,  the Tunceli  peace court  acquitted three young members of  a  leftist
political  party,  sued  on  the  basis  of  the  Article  215  of  the  Turkish  Penal  Code
(concerning the  ‘praise  of  a  crime or  a  criminal’)  for  having commemorated Deniz
Gezmiş,  Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan, leading figures of the Turkish revolutionary
movement of  the late 1960s,  sentenced to death and executed in 1972.  While many
trials had been opened on the basis of this article before, it was the first time such a
case had been dismissed, and not for lack of evidence but on the legal argument that
dead people cannot be considered criminals (Birgün, 15/03/2008).  
56 Also in 2008 the 3rd Heavy Penal Court of Malatya acquitted Rıza Çiçek, wounded by the
Turkish military and accused of ‘belonging to an illegal organization’ (see above), for
lack of evidence. The defendant’s lawyer, Hüseyin Aygün, declared: ‘We believe this is a
very important breakthrough. We congratulate the judge. The fact that he made his
decision without paying much attention to the General Staff’s declaration is promising’.
Aygün added that he would bring the case to the ECHR, as no trial had yet been opened
against the military,  and that he would open a case as well  against the Ministry of
Interior, to ask for reparations for the eight months Çiçek spent in prison awaiting his
trial (Evrensel, 08/05/2008).     
57 Different conclusions may be drawn from these ‘judicial events’.  Regarding the first
three  listed  cases,  the  courts’  decisions  are  important  in  terms  of  guarantees  for
freedom  of  expression  and  offering  activists  and  public  actors  more  (potential)
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protection for operating within a still-restrictive public sphere. Beyond that, two of
these decisions more precisely confer a legal public existence to contentious figures
and symbols (Deniz Gezmiş, Newroz). Of course, Newroz and Deniz Gezmiş have been
celebrated  for  many  years  in  Tunceli,  despite  quite  systematic  legal  harassment.
Activists  have  thus  forced  them into  the  public  sphere,  although at  some risk.   Of
course, these judiciary decisions do not confer legitimacy on the figures and symbols
themselves, or say much directly to the potential for celebrating or commemorating
them,  because  the  court  decisions  regarding  them  were  made  based  on  precise
technical  legal  points.  But  they  nonetheless  produced  tools  for  re-conceiving  and
transforming the  borders  of  the  public  sphere.  The fact  itself  that  judges  accepted
lawyer’s  technical  and innovative legal  argumentation (or  produced this  innovative
argumentation themselves) invites us to further examine the possibility of underlying
transformations of the public sphere. 
58 Again, looking at these few cases, my point is not about demonstrating a steady process
of ‘democratization’ and ‘normalization’ in the last couple of years. In fact,  none of
these decisions turned into a consolidated ‘permissive’ judicial practice. To take just
one example, one year after the ‘Newroz decision’, the public prosecutor intervened to
forbid the Tunceli munipality from using the word Dersim rather than Tunceli on some
posters.  The court stated that there was no such thing as the ‘Dersim municipality’
within  Turkish  borders  and  stated  that  the  ‘Dersim’  appellation  was  ‘serving  the
propaganda  of  the  (PKK)  terrorist  organization’.  The  posters  were  consequently
removed  (Gündem,  10/02/2009).  In  reaction,  a  pro-Kurdish Tunceli  member  of
parliament said he would submit legislation to the Parliament to change ‘Tunceli’ into
‘Dersim’. The Justice Minister in turn called this ‘a move driven by a separatist mindset’
(Nethaber, 12/02/2009). In an account of this affair in the Günlük Gazetesi, the reported
noted that the case was surprising given that in December of 2000, the Malatya Heavy
Penal Court had dismissed a similar case. A Turkish leftist party member was then sued
for  having  used  the  name  ‘Dersim’  during  his  party  convention  and  charged  with
‘making  propaganda  for  an  illegal  organization’.  The  decision  of  the  Court
acknowledged  the  idea  that  the  term  ‘Dersim’  was  used in  diverse  historical  and
scientific texts, as well as newspapers and magazines, and not exclusively by the PKK. It
was further stated that the term ‘Dersim’ has even been found in documents of the
military command (Genelkurmay Baskanlığı)  dating from 1929 and used by Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk and İsmet Inönü themselves (Günlük Gazetesi, 14/02/2009). 
59 This article highlights the fact that there has not been any systematic consolidation of
new  judicial  practices.  Dicle  Koğacıoğlu  may  have  already  provided  some  tools  to
explain  these  apparent  setbacks  or  inconsistencies  in  courts’  decisions  when  she
showed, looking at the Constitutional Court, that judges feel entitled to differentiate
between the political and the cultural domains, so that practices considered ‘harmless
when they are conceptually located as “cultural” and/or “traditional” are considered a
threat when they are “unduly politicized”’ (Koğacıoğlu 2004: 435). In Tunceli, naming
Dersim as threatening and harmless may be as well linked to the personality of the
judge and the way (s)he specifically articulates, in his/her arbitration, elements of the
nationalist  and statist  framework with  other  principles  (Koğacıoğlu  2004:  442).  The
state of the balance of power between local and national politics may also be taken into
account. 
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60 On the other hand,  some of  these new legal  practices  look more durable.  The case
concerning Deniz Gezmiş  may have contributed to changing possibilities concerning
how  even  contentious  public  figures  are  remembered  and  commemorated.  In  the
summer of 2008, two leaders of migrants associations were charged with ‘praising a
crime or a criminal’ for having hung a poster of Seyid Riza, the leader of the resistance
opposed to the Turkish troops in 1936 and 1937. Seyid Riza was arrested and hung in
November  1937.  In  his  argumentation,  the  lawyer  Barış  Yıldırım  used  the  same
technical argument, referring notably to the civil code, to claim that people could not
be  legally  considered  criminals  after  their  death.  In  May  2009,  the  peace  court
dismissed the case. 
61 Violaine Roussel examines this sort of undetermined dimension of the judicial process,
looking at the ‘micro-disruption’ of the game that innovative judicial argumentations
and decisions express. For Roussel, every failure or success, every procedural coup, as
well  as  every stand taken by non-judicial  actors,  is  a  signal  about what might now
become possible to strive for. They thus constitute a frame of possibilities that were
inconceivable within the judicial game until that time (Roussel 2002). In this way, the
decision concerning Rıza Çiçek can be seen as an indication that the judiciary was no
longer prepared to systematically align with categories of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ used
by the security forces and the local governor. In the same way, the Tunceli pro-Kurdish
deputy  and  the  Justice  Ministry’s  interventions  in  the  Dersim  case,  and  the  CHP
delegation’s  involvement in the Rıza Çiçek case,  as  well  as  the Ergenekon trial,  are
many signals that lawyers, prosecutors, and judges use to consider their moves at the
local level. For the lawyers, every successful use of an innovative argument comes to
enlarge the frame of possibilities, encouraging them to push even further, by trial and
error, the borders of the conceivable.  
 
Conclusion
62 Studying  judicial  activism  in  Tunceli  after  1999  demonstrates  that  even  within  a
restrictive  environment,  possibilities  for  legal  challenges  may  be  more  open  than
generally believed. Lawyers and their clients indeed proved capable of exploiting the
state’s inability to act and speak in a single voice and of engaging it at multiple levels.
Moreover, by bringing cases out of the courts and into more general public debate,
lawyers accessed new resources and support networks in their struggle to promote
alternative languages of justice and sets of practices. On this basis, they could engage
law  in  order  to  challenge  the  dominant  discourse  on  security  and  to  force  the
redefinition of the state’s legitimate conceptual borders. 
63 Rather than speculating on a growing receptivity of the prosecutors and judges to the
language of justice and the innovative judicial practices promoted by lawyers, I here
insist, in a processual approach, on the tactical ability of these lawyers to actively push
for the consolidation of these practices. More directly questioning the redefinition of
power alliances through the emergence of a ‘normative community’ would, however,
require more study of the personal, political and professional experiences of judicial
actors and an ethnography of the local legal system to learn about common spaces of
debate  or  socialization.  Finally,  and  in  accordance  again  with  Tezcür’s  conclusions
(2009),  further  attention  should  be  given  to  the  reorganization  of  local  political
configuration around multiple, possibly competing, centers of power. In Tunceli, the
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alliance between the military and the judiciary appears this way to be redefined in
reaction  to  the  emergence  of  political  Islam on  the  local  scene.  Recent  corruption
affairs involving the AKP in 2009 elections but also award of contracts referred to the
court could provide us with new readings of the transformation in relations between
state and society. 
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NOTES
1.  The  research  for  this  paper  benefited  from the  financial  support  of  the  French National
Research Agency (ANR) Thematic Program ‘Conflicts, War(s), Violence’, ‘Conflits-TIP’ Project. I
also want to thank Elizabeth Picard, Olivier Grojean, Amonah Achi, Nicole Watts and the two
anonymous readers for  their  stimulating comments and criticisms on previous drafts  of  this
article. 
2.  Between 1936 and 1938, the Turkish government carried out extensive military operations to
secure control of the region of Dersim, renamed Tunceli by a 1936 law. Dersim has for long been
conceived  as  an  unruly  territory,  in  fact  the  last  to  resist  the  centralization  process  of  the
Turkish state. The ‘civilization process’ of Dersim was extremely violent and cost the lives of tens
of thousands of its inhabitants. Survivors were sent afterwards to internal exile, in Turkish-Sunni
dominated areas. Many did not return until the mid-1940s (See Bruinessen 1994; Watts 2000).
From the 1970s on,  the name ‘Dersim’ progressively became a symbol of  political  opposition
while ‘Tunceli’ became closely associated with this violent moment of ‘colonization’. My choice of
the word Tunceli here is notably to underline how the name Dersim is at the core of the process
of renegotiation of state-society relations.  
3.  I here focus on grievances related to abuses committed by the security forces or restrictions
on freedom of speech and political activity. However, inhabitants of Tunceli also resort to courts
to settle more ‘ordinary’ issues – but no less likely to be formulated in political terms – such as a
woman’s right to divorce or disputes over land, thus inviting the judiciary to regulate everyday
life as well.   
4. On ‘cause lawyering’ see, among many others, Sarat & Scheingold (2005).
5. For an international relations approach, see, for example, the CERI project ‘Emerging from
violence’, http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/themes/projets/documents/02/sortir_violence.pdf.
6. Although  most  of  the  cases  examined  here  took  place  in  the  2000s,  some  of  them  were
continuations  of  proceedings  launched  in  the  1990s.  Interpretation  of  the  cases  and  further
insights are based on several years of fieldwork in Turkey and, more specifically, on nine months
spent in the province of Tunceli between 2003 and 2008.
7. My focus is consequently less on what happens within the court than on what is said and done
about the case out of the court. This study would thus be complemented by ethnography of the
courts and trials themselves and would benefit from a closer analysis of the actual trial records. 
8.  Founded in 1962, the National Security Council was composed of civilians (the President, the
Ministers of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, and following the constitutional amendment of
October 2001, the Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister) and members of the armed
forces. It rapidly expanded its power to oversee the actions of the government and parliament.
The 7th reform package passed in July 2003 aimed at limiting the role of the military in the NSC.
However, despite institutional changes, the National Security Council remains highly influential,
if only through more informal channels.   
9. Founded  in  1978  by  Abdullah  Öcalan,  the  PKK  aimed  to  integrate  Marxist-Leninism  with
Kurdish national aspirations. It has led a guerrilla war against the Turkish state since 1984, in
which 44,000 people died, according to recent declarations of the Chief of Staff of the Turkish
Army (Hürriyet, 16/09/2008). Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in 1999 but keeps ‘advising’ the PKK
from prison.  
10.  On the complicated but possibly mutually empowering relation between law, violence and
exception, see notably the March 2007 issue of the Law & Society review (vol. 34, n° 1, 2007).  
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11.  Put into place in 1984 in eight provinces (Adana,  Ankara,  Diyarbakır,  Erzurum, İstanbul,
İzmir, Malatya, Van), these courts were abolished by the Turkish Parliament in May 2004 to be
replaced later by ‘Heavy Penal Courts’. Until 1999, these State Security Courts included military
judges  and prosecutors.  They  adjudicated  in  every  matter  identified  as  threats  against  state
security. They have notably condemned many intellectuals and politicians for ‘inciting people to
hatred’ on the basis of either race or religion. Interestingly enough, almost all of these judgments
have been upheld by the Court of Cassation (Arslan 2007: 236).
12.  Interview with Songül Erol Abdil, conducted with Nicole Watts, August 2008.
13. See, in Turkish, Sancar & Aydın (2009). 59 in-depth interviews were conducted.
14.  Kurdish Human Rights Project’s Fact-finding mission report, Return to a state of emergency?
Protecting Human Rights in South-East Turkey, June 2008, p. 40. The report specifies that the
military court found no evidence against them and acquitted them.
15.  Ibid. p. 46. 
16.  Idem.
17. For an expanded account of this judicial procedure, see the online Istanbul Water Tribunal
report (http://www.boell.de/downloads/ecology/2munzur_en.pdf)
18.  One of the local arguments in favor of the dams was indeed that they would inhibit the
circulation of the guerrillas in the mountains of Tunceli.
19. To give one example, when in 1994, at the height of the conflict, the military was burning
villages  and  forests  in  the  region,  several  villages’  headmen  tried  to  draw  the  attention  of
national leaders. Some of them travelled to Ankara to meet the president of the Federation of
Human Rights  Association and their  deputies.  They were detained upon their  return.  Others
visited Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who assured them that the military could not be involved
and that it consequently had to be the PKK. The Minister of the Interior even suggested that
villagers did this to themselves in order to get compensation. Among these headmen who dared
to protest, several were arrested and detained, threatened and some of them even disappeared,
to be later found dead (Stichting Nederland–Koerdistan 1995: 24-25).
20.  For a report about the content of the indictment and about the adjudication of the Munzur
case,  see,  in  English:  http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:u4Ub0jrZqicJ:tragua.com/archivos-
tla/audiencia-2009-turquia/case-munzur-en.pdf
21. See the statement of the Tunceli lawyer Hüseyin Aygün on that matter (Cihan, 27/02/2009),
http://www.haberler.com/hukukcu-huseyin-aygun-ergenekon-sorusturmasi-haberi/.
22.  For  one  account  among  others,  see  in  Today’s  Zaman  the  article  interestingly  titled:
‘Ergenekon  case  opportunity  to  prove  rule  of  law  in  Turkey’,  04/10/2009,  http://
www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=172293. 
23.  Kurdish Human Rights Project’s News archives, available on http://www.khrp.org/content/
view/198/2/. 
24. The Turkish penal code still does not recognize ‘forced disappearance’ as a crime.
25. Most of the newspapers cited here are known to be left-wing. Some of them (Bianet, Evrensel)
are platforms actively producing and relaying information that is not generally found elsewhere,
especially in mainstream media.
26.  See the Tunceli Bar’s web site at http://www.tuncelibarosu.org.tr/?act=2&p=1
27. Lawyers in Turkey have always been well represented within the political elite. According to
a 1973 article by Frank Tachau and Mary-Jo D. Good, lawyers represented 10 to 15 percent of the
members of Parliament prior to 1950, to become the largest single grouping (27-32 percent) after
1950 (Tachau & Good 1973: 5). I do not have more recent national data but, from the late 1960s
and 1970s onward, lawyers were not to be found only in the mainstream political parties but,
increasingly,  in  the  ranks  of  the  opposition  parties  and  radical  leftist  groups  as  well.  The
investment of young leftist activist lawyers in the Bar of Istanbul in the 1970s opened the way to
the politicization of this bar association for example.  The profession is thus in no way to be
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considered  as  politically  homogeneous;  bridges  between  the  political,  activist  and  legal
professional spheres are multiple and diverse.     
28. Attempts  to  explain  cause  lawyers’  activism  always  run  the  risk  to  be  tautological.  For
stimulating  reflections  on  cause  lawyering,  see,  among  others,  the  thematic  issue  of  Politix
directed by Brigitte Gaïti and Liora Israël (2003).
29. Personal interview with Özgür Ulaş Kaplan in his office, Tunceli, 05/05/2004.
30. For an English account of  this  affair,  see the Amnesty International  public  document on
http://www-secure.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/006/2005/fr/fb3e012f-d51f-11dd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/eur440062005en.html. 
31. The use of the discourse of human rights by local state officials is not new. Even at the height
of the conflict, officials tried to present themselves as the legitimate defenders of human rights.
In December 1996 for example, a statue celebrating human rights was inaugurated in the Tunceli
main square,  in the presence of  the city mayor,  the chief  of  police and the governor of  the
province. However, with the transformation of the security order following 1999 and the efforts
to reconstruct the state as a guarantor of democratic rights and obligations, this discourse of
human rights has taken on a whole new dimension.
32.  Reassigned to Kırşehir in 2008, Öztürk put into place the same program in this province in
the centre of Turkey, 140 kilometers from Ankara.  
33. On this point, see Yanık, Lerna K. (2006).
34.  The  AKP-led  administration  had  prepared  a  bill  proposing  changes  to  the  controversial
article at the beginning of January 2008, which sparked off a months-long public debate. It was
finally not before April 2008 that the Turkish Parliament started debates on the amendment to
finally approve it.    
RÉSUMÉS
This  article  explores  the  uses  of  law in  a  restrictive  and  changing  political  environment.  It
focuses on the specific case of Dersim/Tunceli – a theatre of the PKK/Turkish army warfare in
the 1990s – following the arrest of the PKK leader in 1999 and the lifting of emergency rule in July
2002. The paper analyzes how cause-lawyers resort to law in a period in which the state’s local
ruling and control devices are transforming and in which the ‘rule of law’ has to be reinstated.
While acknowledging the crucial role of the courts in shaping people’s perception of ‘the state’ as
all-encompassing,  the  article  underlines  how people  also  come to  learn  ‘the  state’  as  multi-
layered  and  incoherent  by  facing  obstacles  to  legal  action  and  circumventing  them  in  this
changing and uncertain period. It then discusses justice as a site of contention and argues that
increasing levels of legal activism is directly contributing to the redefinition of the rule of law
and, beyond that, of the conceptual borders of ‘the state’ itself.          
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